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In the urban resurgence accompanying the
growth of the knowledge economy, second-order
cities appear to be losing out to the principal city,
especially where the latter is much larger and
beneﬁts from substantially greater agglomeration
economies. The view that any city can make itself
attractive to creative talent seems at odds with the
idea of a country having just one ‘escalator region’
where the rate of career progression is much
faster, especially for in-migrants. This paper takes
the case of England, with its highly primate
city-size distribution, and tests how its
second-order cities (in size order, Birmingham,
Manchester, Leeds, Newcastle, Bristol, Shefﬁeld,
Liverpool, Nottingham, and Leicester) compare
with London as human-capital escalators. The
analysis is based on the Ofﬁce for National
Statistics Longitudinal Survey of linked census
records for 1991–2001 and uses one key indicator
of upward social mobility – the transition from
White Collar Non-core to White Collar Core. For
non-migrants, the transition rate for the
second-order cities combined is found to fall well
short of London's, but in one case – Manchester –
the rate is signiﬁcantly higher than the rest of the
country outside the Greater South East. Those
moving to the second-order cities during the
decade experienced much stronger upward social
mobility than their non-migrants, but this
‘migrant premium’ was generally similar to that
for London, suggesting that it results from people
moving only after they have secured a better job.*Correspondence to: Tony Champion, Centre for Urban and
Regional Development Studies (CURDS), Newcastle University,
Newcastle upon Tyne, UK.
E-mail: tony.champion@ncl.ac.ukSecond-order cities, therefore, cannot rely on the
speculative migration of talented people but need
suitable jobs ready for them to access. Copyright
© 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.Accepted 11 June 2013
Keywords: human-capital escalator; second-order
cities; England; ONS Longitudinal Study; career
progression; city region
INTRODUCTION
R ecent years have seen an urbanresurgence in many of the countries thatexperienced a major decline in city
fortunes in the 1960s and 1970s (Cheshire, 2006;
Turok and Mykhnendo, 2007). This has been put
down to a combination of factors, including the
effects of globalisation, the shift towards the
quaternary sector of transactional activity, and a
refocusing of government policy on urban
regeneration (Dunning, 2000; Edmonds, 2003;
Malecki, 2007; EU Regional Policy, 2009). Stress
has been laid on the importance of agglomeration
economies accruing to knowledge-based industries
that cluster together (Krugman, 1996; OECD, 1996;
Glaeser and Maré, 2001; Maskell and Malmberg,
2007). In particular, the concentration of high-skill
labour in large metropolitan areas is seen to enable
their employers to make more efﬁcient use of the
available human capital, which leads to these cities
being especially attractive to people from elsewhere
who want to ‘get on’ in their careers (Glaeser and
Saiz, 2003; Montgomery, 2006; Fielding, 2007;
Florida, 2008).
The beneﬁts of such agglomeration economies
cannot, however, be expected to accrue equally to
all large metropolitan areas (Berry and Glaeser,Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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tion, the greater is its growth potential and themore
attractive it is to potential migrants from elsewhere,
thereby leading to a cumulative reaction in the
absence of any major checking ‘diseconomies of
scale’ (MIER, 2009a; Storper and Scott, 2009). This
line of reasoning poses an especially severe
challenge to the economic prospects of the second-
order cities in countries with a primate city-size
distribution and, most notably, in countries whose
second-order cities are striving to throw off the
legacies of the industrial era and restructure away
from textiles, coal, and steel or heavy engineering
(Parkinson et al., 2012).
A classic example of this situation is provided by
the UK, with its pioneering of the industrial
revolution and the growth of London as the
capital of the British Empire. London hugely
dominates the urban system of the UK and – given
that Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland have
some degree of political autonomy – especially that
of England (see in the succeeding text). This is
reﬂected in the commentary on the drivers of the
North–south divide in England (Smith, 1989; Ward,
2011), including the line of research that has
portrayed London and the south-east as England's
‘escalator region’ (starting with Fielding, 1992).
Interregional migration in England is seen to pivot
on London, with young adults being drawn there
to take advantage of faster career progression before
‘stepping off the escalator’ towards the end of their
working lives (Coombes and Charlton, 1992; Fiel-
ding, 1993; Champion et al., 2007).
This paper seeks to discover whether England's
second-order cities are acting as human-capital
‘escalators’ for their residents and also for migrants
that choose them as their destination rather than the
national capital. Is the ‘oversized’ capital in a class
of its own in terms of people's pace of upward occu-
pational mobility? Or does England's second tier of
urban agglomerations show any signs of rivalling
London in this respect? In short, is there any case
that could be made for advising aspiring young
workers to move there rather than to London?
The remainder of the paper comprises four
parts. The ﬁrst sets out the background to this
line of inquiry and its English context in more
detail. This is followed by a description and
justiﬁcation of the approach used in the analysis,
including the related issues of data source and
choice of career-progression metric as well as
selecting and deﬁning the second-order cities.Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.The third section presents the results, starting
with the patterns of career progression of those
who stayed in the same agglomeration over the
reference period and then comparing these with
the fortunes of those who moved to them during
the period. Finally, the paper provides a concluding
discussion and suggestions for further research.
BACKGROUND TO THE RESEARCH
QUESTION
In recent years, there has been a considerable
growth of interest among both policymakers
and researchers in second-order cities, that is,
the tier of urban agglomerations immediately
below the premier city (for reviews, see
Parkinson et al., 2012; Champion and Townsend,
2013). As indicated earlier, this interest has been
stimulated by the decline of manufacturing as
the major production sector and the emergence
of knowledge-based industries, because the latter
are seen as being the most vibrant where they can
take advantage of the greatest agglomeration
economies. Such restructuring has prompted
fears of the largest city beneﬁtting disproportion-
ately at the expense of the second-order cities.
This is even more the case in countries where
the latter are struggling with the legacy of
deindustrialisation, and the largest city is the
national capital with a long-established presence
of command and control functions.
This concern about the economic prospects of
second-order cities is certainly very evident in
Europe (EU) and not least in the UK. For instance,
following a major investigation of EU's ‘second-tier
cities’, Parkinson et al. (2012: 82) concluded that,
although ‘capital cities are crucially important to
their national economies and must be able to
complete in a global market’, their growth should
‘not [be] at the expense of everywhere else’. The risk
is that over time the capitals will so dominate the
urban system that the national economy becomes
spatially and structurally unbalanced. In contrast
to the experience of Germany, where a strong set
of second-order cities was found to be helping to
drive national economic performance, in a clear
majority of EU countries, the gross domestic prod-
uct of the second city in 2007 was less than two-
ﬁfths that of the national capital. On this criterion,
theUK lies at the other extreme fromGermany,with
its second largest urban agglomeration having less
than one-eighth of the gross domestic product ofPopul. Space Place 20, 421–433 (2014)
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gary and with only France and Latvia being simi-
larly unbalanced.
Within the UK, perhaps not surprisingly given
that distance and a degree of political devolution
promises Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland a
measure of insulation from London, it is the
situation in England that has received particular
attention. Although the problems of urban
decline here have long been recognised, urban
regeneration policies were invigorated by the
New Labour government from 1997. The
publication of Towards an urban renaissance
(Rogers Report, 1999) was swiftly followed by a
wide-ranging set of proposals in the White Paper
Our towns and cities (DETR, 2000) and aimed at
promoting more balanced city growth across
England. Building on this, the Sustainable
Communities Plan (ODPM, 2003) established a
planning framework for northern England
focused on eight city regions and their principal
cities (Northern Way, 2004, 2009). By this time,
too, England's eight largest regional cities had
set themselves up as the ‘Core Cities Group’ to
lobby central government for more funds to help
them compete with the capital (Charles et al.,
1999; Core Cities Group, 2004).
Evidence-based assessments of the achievements
and prospects of second-order cities present a very
mixed picture in terms of both consistency across
cities and sustainability over time. The Core Cities
Group (2004) announced that ‘Our cities are back’,
but Parkinson et al. (2006) concluded that the record
across the 56 urban areas covered by their State of the
English Cities report was distinctly patchy. Jones
et al. (2006) identiﬁed Manchester as the
second-order city most likely to capitalise on
growth in the knowledge sector, with Bristol and
Leeds having the next strongest prospects, whereas
MIER (2009b) conﬁrmed thatManchester possessed
more jobs in knowledge-based industries than any
other city outside London. Overman et al. (2009)
demonstrated how improved links within northern
England, especially between Manchester and
Leeds, could build up local critical mass and reduce
the productivity gap with London. Subsequently,
the Great Recession has exposed the fragility of
what progress had been achieved, impacting less
severely on the capital than the second-order cities
because part of the latter's previous growth was
supported by increases in public expenditure that
were then sharply reversed under recessionaryCopyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.conditions (ippr north, 2009; Clayton, 2011; Centre
for Cities, 2012; Parkinson et al., 2012; Champion
and Townsend, 2013). It would seem that the
extra policy support since the 1990s has not
been sufﬁcient to redress the structural weak-
nesses of England's second-order city econo-
mies and indeed may have aggravated them
by diverting skilled labour into higher-paying
public-sector jobs and raising costs for the
private sector (Morton, 2011).
Arguably, the key challenge for cities is to
attract high-quality workers and create suitable
jobs for them. Several studies including Jones
et al. (2006) and MIER (2009b) have followed
Florida (2002) in stressing the importance of the
‘creative class’ to the achievement of sustainable
economic growth in the knowledge economy.
Yet second-order cities, especially those with a
strong manufacturing tradition, face the difﬁculty
of low educational aspiration in the indigenous
population. Another of their problems is the
environmental legacy of the industrial era, which
can deter young aspirers from migrating to them
from elsewhere. Indeed, second-order cities even
struggle to hold on to their home-grown talents
because of a long-standing ‘culture of migration’,
where their high-achieving school leavers expect
to move away in order to get on in their careers
(Champion and Coombes, 2007; Houston et al.,
2008; see also Work Foundation, 2011).
This process has also become an established
part of migration theory. Two decades ago
Fielding (1992) set out the hypothesis of the esca-
lator region in which people move as young
adults to the part of the country where they can
achieve most rapid promotion and then leave it
towards the end of their working lives or at
retirement in order to live in a place with lower
living costs and a better quality of life. His case
study of England and Wales, using data for the
1971–1981 intercensal decade, conﬁrmed the
escalator role of London and the south-east: this
region was characterised by a higher rate of
upward social mobility than any other; it saw
net in-migration of young adults who managed
even faster promotion than the indigenous
population, and it experienced net out-migration
of older people who overall were downshifting
in labour market terms. Subsequent studies have
largely reinforced these ﬁndings (Fielding,
2007; Findlay et al., 2009; Champion, 2012;
Gordon, 2012).Popul. Space Place 20, 421–433 (2014)
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that this research puts too much stress on moving
to the escalator region of a country: it is almost as
if those who choose not to move there are seen as
doomed to second-class status in their working
lives. Yet, even in Fielding's original (1992) work,
it was clear that these things were relative, not
absolute: people living in other regions besides
the south-east did experience upward social
mobility over time but just not as quickly and/
or surely as in the escalator region. At the urban
rather than regional scale, Devine et al. (2003)
found evidence in Manchester that it is possible
to forge a successful professional career without
moving to London, while Findlay et al. (2003,
2008) and van Ham et al. (2012) have identiﬁed
considerable upward social mobility amongst
migrants to Edinburgh. In the Canadian context,
Newbold and Brown (2012) demonstrated that
those moving to Toronto achieve an income
premium over that city's indigenous population
but so too do migrants to Canada's other large
metropolitan areas, albeit a somewhat smaller one.
This previous research raises the issue of how
far the concept of escalator region should be
considered in absolute terms (i.e. one per
country) rather than in relative terms where
potentially all places can be considered to act as
escalators but merely operate at different speeds.
It is also possible that the macro-regional scale
used in Fielding's analyses masks the existence
of second-order cities with higher than average
rates of upward social mobility. This study
therefore aims to test whether there are any
second-order cities that rival London as places
where people progress their careers more rapidly
than the norm, and thereby attract in-migration
in the way that Florida (2002) has argued. The
rest of this paper presents the methodology and
results of a systematic city-level study that
compares London and England's nine next
largest cities on the basis of the pace of career
advancement for their longer-term residents and
their recent in-migrants.
DATA AND METHODOLOGY
Three main methodological issues need to be
addressed in order to ﬁnd out the extent to which
second-order cities compare with London as a
human-capital escalator for their residents and
for migrants that choose one of them as theirCopyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.destination. The ﬁrst step must be the choice of
data source, as this has some inﬂuence on the
subsequent decisions. The second is the identiﬁ-
cation of the urban centres that constitute a
second-order city and the adoption of a consis-
tent basis for delineating both these and London.
The third is the selection of the variable to be
used to measure people's career progression over
time, along with the speciﬁcation of the
population for which this is to be calculated.
As regard the ﬁrst of these issues, in practice
there is just one viable data source, the Ofﬁce
for National Statistics Longitudinal Study
(ONS-LS). This contains the anonymised records
of a sample of just over 1% of people enumerated
in each population censuses of England and
Wales between 1971 and 2001 (not 2011 at the
time of writing). It has been used by the vast
majority of the previous studies on the escalator
region phenomenon in England and Wales,
including the original work by Fielding (1992).
It comes into its own even more when the spatial
focus is shifted from the regional to the urban
scale, given the smaller population size of the
latter units: its sample size is much larger than
alternatives like the Labour Force Survey and
British Household Panel Study (BHPS). In this
connection, the only downside is the ONS's
policy on disclosure control, which is that there
can be no reporting of small counts or any ratios
based on these, with the threshold unfortunately
being raised during the course of this study from
3 to 10, which equates to almost 1,100 people in
grossed-up form and turns out to be quite a large
number in relation to speciﬁc occupational
transitions among migrants to individual cities.
In terms of identifying England's second-order
cities, the aim was to select the largest places
outside the Greater South East (GSE) deﬁned as
London, the South East and the East regions.
Adopting the Primary Urban Area (PUA) basis
used by Parkinson et al. (2006) for analysing their
56 cities, it was found that nine of these contain
200,000 or more jobs, including all eight members
of the Core Cities Group: in rank order on this
criterion, Birmingham, Manchester, Leeds,
Newcastle, Bristol, Shefﬁeld, Liverpool, and
Nottingham. Adding in Leicester, the ninth in size,
makes the list correspond with that used by the
Parkinson et al. (2012) study of ‘second-tier’ cities.
For deﬁning their extent, owing to having to locate
people by home address rather than workplace, itPopul. Space Place 20, 421–433 (2014)
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boundary including workers who commuted to
these jobs. This leads to a ‘city-region’ approach
primarily based on commuting patterns, following
themethoddeveloped for analyses of the eight Core
Cities (Charles et al., 1999). Applying the same
principles to Leicester and London, the resulting
city regions are as shown in Figure 1. All mentions
of ‘city’ in the succeeding texts refer to places
deﬁned on this basis.
For the approach to be taken towards measur-
ing people's career progression, it was decided to
focus on just one key occupational-status
transition, namely the proportion of White Collar
Non-core (WCN) workers moving up to White
Collar Core (WCC) status over the reference
period. This single ‘transition rate’ metric, chosenFigure 1. City regions of London
Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.in preference to an index that averages across
several between-status transitions or to a single
scale ranking people on change in some continu-
ous indicator of occupational status, was seen to
afford greater transparency to the results, poten-
tially guiding subsequent work using alternative
formulations. WCC is deﬁned as SEGs 1, 3, and 4
(i.e. employers and managers in large ﬁrms, and
professional workers), and WCN comprises the
other main non-manual SEGs 2, 5.1, 5.2, and 6 (i.e.
employers and managers in small ﬁrms, ancillary
workers and artists, non-manual supervisors and
junior non-manual). The rationale for this approach
is as follows. In relation to the choice ofWCC as the
destination category, the main emphasis in the
literature in this ﬁeld has been on the uppermost
level of the occupational ladder, or what Fieldingand 9 second-order cities.
Popul. Space Place 20, 421–433 (2014)
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lower-level white-collar work and manual labour.
For the starting category, it was decided not to
include all other occupations because the chances
of moving to high-level white-collar work differs
considerably between them and, as the
occupational composition of places varies
markedly, this effect could dominate the city-level
likelihoods of transition.
A decision was also required about the
population to be included in the analysis. With
issues of sample size in mind, the ﬁrst step would
be to look at the career progression of the whole
cohort of people who were in WCN work at the
start of the intercensal decade, merely restricting
these to the main working-age span of 15–64years,
who would be aged 25–74years by the end of the
decade. As far as sample size permitted, this could
be subdivided by gender and broad age group. It
was also decided to restrict the study population
to those who were also in employment at the end
of the reference decade, so as to ensure as far as
possible that their recorded occupational status
truly reﬂected their situation then as opposed to
being inherited from their most recent job before
leaving work, whether due to retirement,
redundancy, ill-health, or caring for family. This ap-
proach parallels that of Newbold and Brown (2012)
who restrict their analysis to people in work. Two
groups of people are distinguished: ‘non-migrants’
– those living in the same city region at the end of
the decade as at its start – and ‘migrants’ – all those
who moved into a city region during the decade
apart from those who had moved less than 40km.
The latter precaution was designed to ﬁlter out the
short-distance cross-boundary moves that would
probably not be accompanied by a change of
workplace: the latter would have been the more
relevant locator for this study but was not available
in the data set. Lastly, although migrant sample
numbers would have been boosted by including
those who started the reference decade in Scotland
and Northern Ireland, this was not possible
because the ONS-LS is restricted to England and
Wales and cannot be readily integrated with the
other two UK Longitudinal Studies (but see van
Ham et al., 2012, for a similar study of Scotland).
RESULTS
Adopting the parameters set out earlier, the
test of how far England's second-order citiesCopyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.compare with London as human-capital
escalators is organised in two main steps. Fol-
lowing Fielding (1992), the ﬁrst examines the
extent to which the 10 cities vary in their
capacity to act as escalators for their non-migrant
population, based on the transition rate from
WCN to WCC in a decade. The second step
applies the same metric to the migrants to each
city. Here places are compared not only to
discover how strong an escalator function they
perform for their migrants but also to see
how the latter fare relative to their non-
migrants. In both of these steps, the examination
of the whole sample is followed by a
breakdown by gender and broad age group to
check that the results are not affected by
differences in demographic composition. The
primary focus is on the comparison between
London and the other nine cities, with the
latter being treated as an aggregate so as to
achieve the most robust results but, ﬁnally,
the cities are treated individually as far as
sample size and disclosure rules permit.Non-migrant Transition Rates for London
Compared with the 9 Second-order Cities
Combined
Looking ﬁrst at London, the ONS-LS sample
contains 14,372 records of people who were
living in its city region (Figure 1) in both 1991
and 2001, were aged 15–64 years in 1991 and
engaged in WCN work at that time and were also
in work 10 years later (equivalent to almost
1.6 million when grossed up). A total of 2,270 of
these Longitudinal Study members had moved
up to a WCC occupation by 2001, that is, 15.8%
of the non-migrant WCN starters. This transition
rate compares with one of 12.2% for the other
nine cities combined, which is very similar to
the 12.4% for the rest of England and Wales. This
suggests that – at least at the scale of this 3-fold
division – London was in a class of its own in
providing a greater than average chance of this
career progression in 1991–2001, whereas the
second-order cities offer no advantage over
the rest of the country. Thus, compared with the
second-order cities' aggregate, the chances of
making this transition were 30% higher in
London. It is clear that the capital's superiority
as a place where people can get on in their careers
has survived the many labour-market changes ofPopul. Space Place 20, 421–433 (2014)
DOI: 10.1002/psp
427England's Second-Order Cities as Human-Capital ‘Escalators’?recent decades. Indeed, exploratory analyses
undertaken early in this study suggest that the
margin between London and the second-order
cities may even have widened since the 1970s.
Can demographic composition help to explain
this difference in transition rate between the
second-order cities and London, with the latter
containing more of the types of people who tend
to progress more quickly in their working lives,
notably younger people? Certainly, London's
population is known to have been rejuvenating
itself since the 1970s, as a result of the combined
effects of older people leaving, of younger adults
moving in, and of increasing numbers of births
(Champion, 2006). Nevertheless, Figure 2 shows
that the ‘London premium’ remains largely intact
in analyses distinguishing four broad age groups
and also splitting men from women. Overall,
women display lower transition rates than men, as
do those aged 35years or over in 1991 (becoming
45years and over by 2001) compared with the two
younger cohorts. But it is clear that London system-
atically outperforms the second-order cities' aggre-
gate for both men and women and for all the age
cohorts shown, albeit it by a smaller margin for
the oldest one.
Migrant Transition Rates for London Compared
with the 9 Second-order Cities Combined
The second step is to look at the equivalent transi-
tion rates for these places' in-migrant populations0.0
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Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.(as deﬁned earlier). Although the career progression
of non-migrants suggests that London offers clearly
superior prospects, there were 5,586 people in the
sample (over 610,000 grossed up) who were living
in a second-order city in 2001 but had been living
elsewhere in England and Wales (including one of
the other second-order cities) in 1991 and, of these,
22% (1,231) were working in a WCN occupation
in 1991 and were still in some type of job in 2001.
At least part of the reason for this migration can
be found in the WCN-to-WCC transition rates.
According to the ONS-LS data, those moving into
one of the 9 second-order cities between 1991 and
2001 managed to progress faster as a group than
would be expected from the non-migrant transition
rates described in the previous texts. Of the 1,231
WCN starters, 273 had progressed to WCC jobs by
2001. This transition rate of 22.2% is very much
higher than the 12.2% rate for the second-order
cities' non-migrants. Moreover, it is substantially
above the rate for the equivalent groupmoving into
the rest of England and Wales from all 10 cities
(19.7%), although well short of the 26.0% rate for
those moving into London during the decade.
Compositional effects need to be considered
when comparing the second-order cities' migrants
with their non-migrants. Certainly, it is well known
(Boyle et al., 1998) that migration tends to be a
selective process, with young adults being
disproportionately represented in longer-distance
moves – and also a socially biased one, althoughLo
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group (Source: calculated from the Ofﬁce for National
data. Crown copyright.)
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extent by restricting the sample to just those who
were inWCNwork at the start. The test is provided
in Table 1, which breaks down the migrant
transition rates by gender and age and compares
them with the non-migrant rates that formed the
basis of Figure 2 (apart from those aged
50–64years in 1991 for whom an element of the
ratio for migrants fails to meet the ONS disclosure
threshold). It can be seen that the second-order
cities' transition rate for migrants is higher than
the non-migrant one for each of the population
groups. The same is also the case for London.More-
over, the ‘migrant premium’ for the second-order
cities is virtually identical to London's for all
persons and varies more or less in tandem with
London's across the population groups. These
results conﬁrm the ﬁndings of Fielding's original
(1992) study that migrants tend to get on better in
their careers than non-migrants, but additionally
suggest that this must be related to some other
factor(s) besides those of gender, age, and starting
occupational level allowed for here.
Table 1 also permits a cross-group comparison of
transition rates between those migrating to a
second-order city and those going to London as
well as facilitating a comparison of this London
premium for migrants with that of the non-
migrants' performances already described. For allTable 1. White Collar Non-core to Core transition rates, 1991
9 second-order cities combined by population group.
Group with age in 1991 (years) City
All 15–64 London
Second-order cities
London premium
Males 15–64 London
Second-order cities
London premium
Females 15–64 London
Second-order cities
London premium
All 15–24 London
Second-order cities
London premium
All 25–34 London
Second-order cities
London premium
All 35–49 London
Second-order cities
London premium
Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.the population groups shown, the migrants' transi-
tion rates are always higher for London than for
the second-order cities, just as is the case for the
non-migrants' rates. Impressively, for the most part,
the two sets of differences move in parallel,
reinforcing the image of similarity given by the all-
persons' differences of 3.6 and 3.8 percentage points
for non-migrants and migrants, respectively. For
instance, the London/second-order-city difference
of 5.0 points for migrant men is not much greater
than the 4.6 for non-migrants, whereas the
differences for those aged 25–34years in 1991
(becoming 35–44years in 2001) are even more
closely matched. On the other hand, the migrant/
non-migrant differences are somewhat wider apart
for those aged 15–24years and 35–49years. Also,
the transition rate for London's migrants reduces
with age unlike for the second-order cities. The
overriding feature, however, is of the margin of
difference between London and the second-order
cities in the chances of occupational progression
being about the same for their recent in-migrants
as for their longer-term populations.The 10 Cities Compared
The role of place can be probed further by examin-
ing the 9 second-order cities individually and
comparing their transition rates with London's,–2001, for migrants and non-migrants: London and the
Non-migrants Migrants Migrant premium
15.8 26.0 10.2
12.2 22.2 10.0
3.6 3.8
23.1 37.3 14.2
18.5 32.3 13.8
4.6 5.0
10.1 15.6 5.5
8.2 13.4 5.2
1.9 2.3
17.0 27.5 10.6
13.1 22.6 9.5
3.8 4.9
18.6 25.6 7.1
14.6 21.9 7.3
4.0 3.8
14.3 24.2 9.9
10.7 22.9 12.2
3.7 1.4
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ble to do this for the breakdown of population
subgroups used earlier owing to the relatively small
numbers in the migrant category of some cities.
Table 2 shows the transition rates for those who
were living in a particular city at both dates, and
those who moved to it from elsewhere in England
andWales (including one of the other cities) during
the decade. The cities are arranged in size order in
order to help in checking for agglomeration effects.
As a further reﬁnement, the rest of the country is
subdivided into the rest of theGSE (see the previous
text), and the remainder, as the latter constitutes a
more valid benchmark for the performance of the
nine provincial cities, which lie outside this
generally prosperous region.
As mentioned earlier, the ﬁrst test for how
strongly places perform as escalators of human
capital is based on their non-migrant populations.
It can be seen (from the ﬁrst two data columns of
Table 2) that agglomeration effects operate on at
least a partial basis. None of the second-order cities
has a higher non-migrant transition rate than
London, whereas Manchester ranks in second
place, which is close to its size ranking. Beyond this,
however, the relationship is less clear, with the third
highest transition rate being for Leicester, the
smallest of the cities. Indeed, allowing for sample
size, t-test results show that, of the 9 second-order
cities, only Manchester has a rate signiﬁcantly
above that 11.5% benchmark. Nevertheless, acrossTable 2. White Collar Non-core to Core transition rates, 1991
by size, the rest of Greater South East (GSE) and the rest of
City region Size (000s) Non-m
London 4,448 15
Birmingham 1,047 11
Manchester 878 13
Leeds 397 12
Newcastle 365 11
Bristol 361 11
Shefﬁeld 337 12
Liverpool 335 10
Nottingham 281 11
Leicester 208 13
9 second-order cities n/a 12
Rest of GSE n/a 13
Rest of E&W n/a 11
Note: Size is based on total number of employees working in the city's Prima
*Difference from the rest of E&W signiﬁcant at 5% (t-test).
Source: calculated from the Ofﬁce for National Statistical Longitudinal Study
Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.the 10 cities calculations suggest a degree of
size effect: a correlation coefﬁcient of 0.73
between the transition rate and the log of
number of jobs is signiﬁcant at the 5% level
and indicates that on this measure agglomera-
tion effects account for around half of the
between-place variance in cities' non-migrant
career advancement.
Turning to the migrants, it might have been
expected from the previous section that there
would be a stronger role for agglomeration
effects, given the progressive fall in migrant
transition rate from London to the 9 second-order
cities combined and then to the aggregate of the
smaller labour markets that make up the rest of
England and Wales (26.0%, 22.2%, and 19.7%, re-
spectively). On the contrary, however, the pattern
for migrants shown in Table 2 (third data column)
is found to be less related to size than the one for
non-migrants. London does not stand above all
the others and, moreover, on a par with it are
Leeds and Leicester rather than the
second-largest or third-largest cities. Overall, the
correlation between the migrants' transition rate
and the log of number of jobs is only 0.21, well
below the 0.63 level required for a 5% signiﬁcance
with just 10 cases. Moreover, London is the only
place where migrants fare signiﬁcantly better (at
the 5% level) than those moving to the non-GSE
rest of England, although this test is affected
by the small number of migrant cases for some–2001, for migrants and non-migrants: 10 cities ranked
England and Wales (E&W).
igrants Migrants Migrant premium
.8* 26.0* 10.2
.8 21.7 9.9
.9* 20.7 6.7
.1 26.0 13.9
.3 15.2 4.0
.7 21.4 9.7
.2 22.4 10.2
.7 20.0 9.3
.7 21.1 9.4
.3 27.0 13.7
.2 22.2 10.0
.2* 21.1 7.9
.5 19.4 7.9
ry Urban Area in 2001 (see section on Methodology);
data. Crown copyright.
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kNottingham, and Shefﬁeld with between 65
and 116, much lower than London's 759).
A related question concerns the extent to
which the fortunes of the migrants are affected
by the differences between the 10 cities in their
ability to perform as escalators for their non-
migrants. The correlation coefﬁcient between the
transition rates of the migrants and non-
migrants, at 0.57, is positive but not signiﬁcant
at the 5% level. Instead, what is most remarkable
about the migration premiums shown for the
10 cities in Table 2 is how similar they are, with
the majority falling in the narrow band of 9.3–10.2
and with none differing signiﬁcantly from the
rest of England and Wales. This suggests more
of a ﬂat-rate bonus for the migrants in that,
irrespective of the actual performance of each
city's escalator, an additional 10% or so of the
WCNs ‘stepping on to these escalators’ achieve
WCC status compared with the progress made
by these places' longer-term residents. This
migrant premium is therefore not just associated
with a move to the national escalator region that
is London, but applies to other destinations too.
This observation helps to explain why, despite
most of these second-order cities performing less
strongly as escalators than London, people of
working age are still prepared to move to them.
DISCUSSION
This paper has examined the extent to which
England's second-order cities perform a role akin
to the ‘regional escalator’ function previously
observed for London's region, using data from
the ONS LS and focusing on one key indicator
of occupational mobility, namely moving up from
WCN to WCC during an intercensal decade. This
section summarises the main ﬁndings and
discusses their signiﬁcance. The results are seen
to conﬁrm the value of tracking over time
people's spatial mobility alongside their social
mobility, but they also raise questions which
merit further research.
The ﬁrst main ﬁnding is that, although many
people rise in occupational status as they age
through a decade, their chances of doing so vary
according to both the type of person they are
and the type of place they live in. At the same
time, between-place differences in the WCN-
to-WCC transition rates are not caused byCopyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.compositional factors, or at least not by the ones
allowed for here. It would seem that, as far as
the non-migrant population is concerned, the 9
second-order cities as a group did fall well short
of London in terms of this transition rate for
1991–2001 and in fact fared no better than the rest
of the country. Taking the nine separately,
however, a considerable range of performance is
found that can partly be explained in terms of
agglomeration effects and, among them, there is
one – Manchester – that posts a transition rate
which justiﬁes it being seen as a ‘mini London’
in the opportunities it offers its residents.
A rather different picture, however, has
emerged when considering these places as
potential escalators for migrants to ‘step on to’.
People going to a second-order city, on average,
fare better than those moving to the rest of the
country, especially if the latter is restricted to the
part beyond the GSE. Moreover, the migrants do
better at their destinations than the non-migrant
populations – something that applies everywhere
and does not seem to be related to compositional
effects. On the basis of this evidence, it seems that
the second-order cities do act as escalators for
those moving into them, raising these people's
chances of transitioning from WCN to WCC by
around 10 percentage points on average
compared with the longer-term residents of these
places, a ‘migration premium’ that is almost iden-
tical to the one achieved by moving to London.
So, what is it that helps to make these second-
order cities act as escalators for their migrant
populations almost as well as London, given that
they perform less well for their non-migrants? It
does not seem to have anything to do with
migrant selectivity in terms of gender, age, and
occupational status at the start of the reference
period. One potentially important factor is what
Gordon (2012) termed ‘ambition’ and has
estimated using the attitudinal information
collected by the BHPS (not available in the
census-derived data in the ONS-LS). It seems
plausible that it is only the more ambitious, able,
and enterprising among those in WCN jobs that
are prepared to up sticks and take the risk of a
long-distance move to another area.
Alternatively, maybe this outcome has more to
do with the way in which much of the job search
and staff recruitment process works nowadays, at
least in relation to the higher-skilled sections of
the labour market. Fewer people are nowPopul. Space Place 20, 421–433 (2014)
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work, while more are moving home only after
they have been successful in their job search and
even then may delay making a permanent move
and instead commute on a weekly basis. Also,
presumably employers would normally appoint
a person from a distance only if they could not
ﬁnd a suitable candidate in their local area, or if
the more distant applicant was much better
suited. Another reason behind longer-distance
labour migration that is now seen as more
important than in the past is the relocation of
continuing employees between the branches of
multi-site ﬁrms and government agencies, which
in many cases would be associated with staff
promotion (Findlay et al., 2003).
These possible explanations, in their various
ways, raise questions about the nature of a
labour-market escalator and what exactly drives
the migration of people towards it, with such
issues relating just as much to the archetypal
escalator of London as to second-order cities.
The original model is based on the premise that,
in moving to a place like London, people advance
their careers faster than staying where they were
living previously because they are able to ‘ride’
the faster-moving escalator at their destination
alongside the local residents, with the overall
effect presumably increasing the longer the
in-migrant lives there. More recent research (Find-
lay et al., 2009) argues that this combination of
spatial and social mobility should be broken down
into two elements; namely, the immediate change
in occupational status at the time of ‘stepping on
the escalator’, and the change which takes place
subsequently while ‘riding the escalator’. Fielding's
notion of the escalator emphasises the latter
component, but for in-migrants, the two cannot
readily be split using data for a single period.
In conclusion, it would be over-hasty to treat
the observed migration premium as a validation
of policies seeking to speed up the economic
growth of second-order cities through attracting
more migrant talent along the lines proposed by
Florida (2002). If it is the case that most of the
migration of human capital into these cities takes
place only after a job has been secured, then any
attempt to increase migration to them is depen-
dent on employment growth there. This needs
to be checked by investigating how much of
migrants' change in occupational status occurs
at the time of the move. Within the ONS-LS, thisCopyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.could be attempted by deﬁning migrants as those
who moved in the previous decade and
comparing their career progress during their
move decade with that achieved in the
subsequent decade, but the effect of the move
itself could be pinpointed more accurately from
an alternative data set that monitors change in
occupation more frequently, such as the Annual
Survey of Hours and Earnings.
Beyond this, there are at least three other ways
in which this line of research could be developed
and taken forward. Firstly, multivariate
modelling would allow a fuller like-for-like
comparison of migrants and non-migrants that
takes into account the effect on career trajectories
of other personal characteristics not allowed for
in the present study. Unfortunately, however,
the ONS-LS does not contain the sort of informa-
tion on people's attitudes that Gordon (2012)
used to derive a measure of ambition which
proved so powerful in his BHPS-based analysis
of occupational mobility. Secondly, this study
has focused on just the one occupational
transition of changing from WCN to WCC, albeit
this being a key one in relation to the totality of
longer-distance migration as well as to places'
economic fortunes. A case can be made for
comparing these results with those for other
occupational transitions or, alternatively, for
adopting a single scale of job-status change like
that developed by Gordon (2012). Finally, given
that urban regeneration programmes continued
after 2001, opportunity should be taken of the
incorporation of 2011 Census data into the
ONS-LS (due for release by 2014) for discovering
whether the most recent decade has seen any
narrowing of London's advantage over the
second-order cities as a human-capital escalator.
The results of this updating could be set in a
longer-term context by comparing the differences
between these two latest decades with the
equivalent patterns of change in the previous
two decades back to 1971.
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